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1. Remaining problems in the study of fallacies 
 
 Since Hamblin’s (1970) devastating portrayal of the state of the art in the study of 
fallacies in the 1960s, several new theoretical approaches have been developed in which the 
fallacies are viewed as “wrong moves in argumentative discourse” rather than as “arguments 
that seem valid but are in fact not” (van Eemeren, 2001).1 Although, in general, nowadays 
Hamblin’s criticisms no longer apply, a fully satisfactory theory of the fallacies is in our view 
still lacking. For one thing, the intriguing problem of the remarkable persuasiveness of (a 
great many of) the fallacies, which in the traditional standard definition of a fallacy was 
referred to by the word “seem,” has not been addressed.2 More importantly, a systematic 
treatment is still lacking of the criteria needed to pin down manifestations of the various types 
of fallacies in everyday argumentative discourse. In this paper, we shall argue that a better 
idea can be gained of how a great many of the fallacies “work” by incorporating rhetorical 
considerations into a dialectical approach of the fallacies. This theoretical renewal will lead to 
a fuller understanding of the demarcation between argumentative moves that are sound and 
fallacious argumentative acting.  
 
 
2. Ad hoc treatments and systematic treatments of the fallacies 
 
 A great many fallacy theorists tend to take the traditional list of fallacies as it is 
handed down by history and established in the literature as their point of departure. A major 
disadvantage of such a treatment of the fallacies is that it is in fact ad hoc.3 In spite of 
Woods’ (1992) protestations, rather than a systematic and theoretically motivated catalogue 
of the fallacies, the traditional list is a more or less arbitrary collection of the diverse kinds of 
argumentative moves that have earlier been recognized as fallacious. 
 A fundamental problem of giving each fallacy its own treatment is that not only the 
treatments may be at variance with each other,4 but also the theoretical perspectives from 
which the treatments start. In our view, it is a crucial requirement of any theoretically 
adequate evaluation of argumentative discourse, whether it is given in terms of fallacies or 
not, that the norms that are applied in the evaluation have a common rationale that guarantees 
their pertinence and coherence. This rationale and the norms used in its implementation 
should reflect a clearly defined philosophical ideal of reasonableness and rationality.5
 Another crucial requirement is that the norms that are used in the evaluation of 
argumentative discourse can be made instrumental by relying on specific and applicable 
criteria that make it possible to decide in specific instances of argumentative discourse 
whether a certain norm has been violated or not. Otherwise the outcomes of the evaluative 
judgments cannot be properly justified.6
 In more systematic treatments of the fallacies, such as Hamblin’s (1970) and Barth 
and Krabbe’s ‘formal dialectics’ (1982),7 and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s ‘pragma-
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dialectics’ (1984, 1992a, 2003),8 the requirements we just mentioned are, at least partly, taken 
into account. Instead of taking the traditional list of fallacies as their point of departure, these 
dialectical fallacy theorists start from a general critical rationalist perspective on 
argumentative discourse as a dialectical exchange of moves aimed at testing the acceptability 
of standpoints that serves as their rationale for designing particular theoretical systems or 
models of a sound critical discussion. Fallacies are then conceived as argumentative moves 
excluded by the rules of a particular dialectical system or as moves that violate the rules of 
the procedural model for conducting a critical discussion. In both cases, the reasons for 
finding fault with such moves are independent of the traditional listing of the fallacies and 
these reasons are closely related with the general goal that is attributed to the discourse.9 In 
pragma-dialectics, this general goal is resolving a difference of opinion by testing the 
acceptability of the standpoints at issue.10
 Although the systematic requirement has thus been fulfilled that the norms for 
evaluating argumentative discourse have a common rationale that guarantees their pertinence 
and coherence, in pragma-dialectics and other dialectical approaches some other desiderata 
have not yet been fulfilled: (1) adequate criteria for deciding in concrete cases univocally 
whether or not a certain rule has been violated are still lacking; (2) no explanation has been 
given for why a lot of fallacies can be so persuasive; (3) no clues have been given as to why 
fallacies do so easily go unnoticed. 
 An important reason why dialecticians have been so slow in developing the criteria 
that are needed to be able to check whether the rules are correctly applied in practice, is that 
so far they have almost exclusively concentrated on the critical objectives presupposed in 
their rules, without being interested in other kinds of purposes of the arguers. Paying attention 
to the reasons a party may have in ordinary discourse for not complying with the rules 
because of the pursuit of other purposes, which may be at odds with the aims of a critical 
discussion, may lead to an explanation of why a violation of a rule for critical discussion is 
sometimes inevitable. It is therefore imperative to know in each stage of a critical discussion 
what the other relevant purposes can be.  
 Deviations from the rules of critical discussion are often at the same time persuasive 
as well as hard to detect because normally the parties involved are very keen on maintaining 
the pretence of reasonableness and portraying themselves as living up to critical standards. It 
can therefore be expected that, in order to realize a purpose that is potentially at odds with the 
objective of a critical discussion rule, they will stick as much as possible to the means 
available for achieving the relevant critical objective and attempt to “stretch” the use of these 
means in such a way that the other purpose can be realized as well. This predicament makes it 
necessary for the analyst to know in advance as much as possible about the ways in which the 
means that can be used to achieve the specific objective of a certain stage in a critical 
discussion can be employed parasitically to realize purposes that may be at odds with this 
objective. Except for Walton (1992) and Walton and Krabbe (1995), the dialectical theorists 
have ignored the issue of multi-purposes and cross-purposes in real-life argumentative 
discourse.11
 
 
3. Including the rhetorical dimension in a dialectical treatment of the fallacies  
 
 In several recent papers about our pragma-dialectical approach to the fallacies we 
have taken due account of the persuasive aims of the arguers engaged in argumentative 
discourse (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002a, 2002b). In this endeavor, we started from the 
assumption that persuasive aims need not necessarily be realized at the expense of achieving 
critical objectives. The arguers’ attempts to have things their way can very well be 
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incorporated in their efforts to resolve a difference of opinion in accordance with the 
standards for critical discussion: while the arguers can be presumed to maintain these critical 
standards, they can, in our view, at the same time be presumed to be out for an optimal 
persuasive result. In their efforts to achieve this result, they may resort to what we have 
termed strategic maneuvering directed at simultaneously achieving critical and persuasive 
aims by diminishing the potential tension between them. 
 Of course, our view of strategic maneuvering, which is basically aimed at reconciling 
dialectical and rhetorical objectives, does by no means mean that we think that the two different 
objectives will in the end always be in perfect balance. On the one hand, arguers may neglect 
their persuasive interests for fear of being perceived as unreasonable; on the other hand, in their 
assiduity to win the other party over to their side, they may neglect their commitment to the 
critical ideal. If parties allow their commitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to 
be overruled by their aim of persuading the opponent, their strategic maneuvering violates a 
particular discussion rule and has got “derailed.” Because this kind of maneuvering may 
victimize the other party, we are entitled to consider it fallacious. 
 Not in all cases the demarcation line between sound and fallacious strategic 
maneuvering is immediately clear. We have just given an account that explains why fallacies 
are usually not immediately apparent to everyone. In everyday argumentative discourse, 
arguers who maneuver strategically will normally uphold a commitment to the standards of 
critical reasonableness and their interlocutors will expect them to live up to such a 
commitment. Thus, an assumption of reasonableness is conferred on every discussion move 
(see also Jackson, 1995). Even when a particular way of maneuvering is fallacious because it 
violates a certain discussion rule, unless there are clear indications to the contrary, this 
assumption of reasonableness is still operative. Echoing the “standard” definition of a fallacy, 
we can then say that the maneuvering pretends to comply with the rules of critical discussion, 
but in fact does not. 
 
 
4. Fallacies and derailments of strategic maneuvering 
 
 Instead of beginning and ending with the traditional or any other list of fallacies, our 
approach takes as its starting point of analysis the various types of strategic maneuvering. An 
important advantage of this starting point is that it makes it possible to clarify the relationship 
between the fallacies and their “sound counterparts,” and to explain the potentially persuasive 
character of the fallacies and the fact that they often go unnoticed.12 We shall now focus on 
the ways in which our approach can be of help in developing criteria for identifying instances 
of fallacious argumentative acting. 
 In our view, each type of strategic maneuvering has, in a manner of speaking, its own 
“continuum” of sound and fallacious acting. Although fallacy judgments are in the end 
always contextually determined judgments regarding specific instances of situated 
argumentative acting, this does not mean that no clear criteria can be established in advance 
to determine whether a particular way of strategic maneuvering goes astray. Particular types 
or categories of strategic maneuvering can be identified. For each of these types, specific 
conditions can be determined that must be fulfilled if the maneuvering is to be sound. Certain 
manifestations of strategic maneuvering can then be recognized as legitimate while other 
manifestations can be pinned down as fallacious because the relevant conditions have not 
been met. 
 The criteria for determining fallacies can only be fully developed in a systematic way 
if first a well-considered classification is available of the diverse types of strategic 
maneuvering and a specification is given of their soundness conditions. Such a classification 
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of the types of strategic maneuvering should be based on a systematic specification of both 
the critical aims and the persuasive aims that the parties may be supposed to attempt to 
achieve at the various stages of an argumentative exchange. In our view, a good starting point 
for specifying these aims is provided by the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion. 
This model specifies the critical objectives of the parties in the four discussion stages. Each 
of these critical objectives has, as we have argued earlier, its complementary ‘rhetorical’ aim: 
in each discussion stage, the parties can attempt to achieve such complementary rhetorical 
aims to realize their own persuasive intents and may thus arrive at making a move that 
optimally furthers their own case. At all stages of the discussion, strategic maneuvering will 
be aimed at doing so in such a way that the critical objective of the stage concerned is not 
ignored – at least not openly. Therefore, the critical objectives of each particular discussion 
stage determine what the strategic maneuvering may be aimed at.13 This fundamental insight 
makes it possible to identify for each stage the potential discrepancy between the dialectical 
and the rhetorical aims, the types of strategic maneuvering relevant for dissolving this 
discrepancy, and the soundness conditions of each type of strategic maneuvering that can be 
applied when accounting for the judgment that a certain type of strategic maneuvering has in 
a particular case got derailed and a particular type of fallacy has been committed. 
 
 
5. The tu quoque fallacy as a derailment of pointing out inconsistencies  
 
 As a case in point, we shall discuss the demarcation of non-fallacious and fallacious 
instances of a specific type of strategic maneuvering that takes place in the opening stage of a 
critical discussion. In this type of maneuvering a party attacks the other party by pointing out 
a logical or pragmatic inconsistency between a starting point proposed by the other party and 
a starting point this party assumed on a different occasion. Pointing out such an inconsistency 
can be a perfectly sound – and even very strong – strategic maneuver, but it can also derail 
and result in a tu quoque fallacy. 
 When we are talking about inconsistencies between starting points we may refer to 
two kinds of starting points. First, in a proper critical discussion there are always (explicit or 
implicit) procedural starting points. Second, there are also material starting points. Ideally, 
both kinds of starting points should be fully clear. This means that the parties involved in the 
dispute not only know how the discussion is going to be conducted but also what propositions 
they can safely bring to bear once the discussion has come off the ground. Besides agreeing 
on the discussion rules and the division of the burden of proof, the parties should in the 
opening stage of the discussion also reach an agreement on the propositions that may be used 
in the argumentation stage to defend and challenge the standpoints at issue. 
 In argumentative practice, there are certain institutional contexts, such as 
parliamentary debates, in which an agreement on particular procedural starting points is 
presupposed. It may be the case that even some material starting points are established 
beforehand. According to Dutch law the latter applies, for instance, to admissions made by 
the accused in the interrogation preceding the actual trial in a criminal case. Such admissions 
can be used in court to establish conclusions weighing against or in favor of the accused, as 
the case may be. 
 In non-institutionalized argumentative discourse there are usually no explicit 
agreements as to the facts that are pertinent to the points at issue. It would in fact not only be 
highly inefficient, but also superfluous, if each and every discussion had to begin by listing 
all the relevant propositions on which the parties agree. Generally, the parties use certain 
propositions as their starting points without asking for the other party’s consent, but taking 
this consent, rightly or wrongly, for granted. All the same, there are a lot of cases in which it 
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is first negotiated whether or not particular propositions may serve as a common starting 
point. When such negotiations occur, they can be viewed as sub-discussions about the 
acceptability of a sub-standpoint that has emerged in the opening stage of the main 
discussion. Characteristic of such a sub-discussion is that – rather than leading to a 
conclusion as to whether or not the sub-standpoint is acceptable in its own right – it results in 
a conclusion as to whether or not the proposition can be used as a common starting point. 
 The dialectical profile of the initial exchange of moves in such negotiations is as 
follows. The protagonist, aiming at securing a basis for his defense, initiates the negotiation 
process by proposing to consider a specific proposition as a common starting point. He can, 
for instance, claim that the proposition concerned is a good point of departure for the 
discussion and invite the antagonist to accept it as a mutual starting point: “We simply have 
to start somewhere. If you would agree with me on this, it is not so difficult to see what 
should happen next.” Alternatively, he can attribute the proposition boldly to the antagonist, 
as in “You do think that we need to get rid of this, don’t you?” followed by “Well, why don’t 
we just give it away then?” He can also try to elicit this proposition as a ‘concession’ from 
the antagonist. In all these cases, it is up to the antagonist to react. The antagonist may accept 
the protagonist’s proposal, so that the negotiation comes to an end, but he can also reject the 
proposal. In the latter case, the antagonist may make either of two moves. He can deny the 
proposed proposition just like that the status of a common starting point: “I do not agree with 
that.” He can also give reasons why the proposition should not be treated as a common 
starting point: “You cannot just assume that. It is not at all clear what will happen.”14
Viewed dialectically, the antagonist is under no obligation to provide a reason for not 
admitting a proposition as a common starting point (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003, 
Ch. 6). Viewed rhetorically, however, it may be better if he does. After all, it is generally 
regarded of no use to start a discussion with people who refuse to commit themselves to any 
common starting point or, without giving any further explanation, to a specific starting point. 
Explaining why a certain proposition is denied the status of a common starting point can thus 
be regarded as a germane form of strategic maneuvering. This type of maneuvering is aimed 
at reconciling the rhetorical aim of admitting only starting points that are agreeable to the 
antagonist’s own position and the dialectical objective of achieving sufficient common 
ground for a critical discussion. By refusing to accept a particular proposition as a starting 
point, the antagonist goes against the latter objective. He is therefore well advised to show 
that the refusal is not gratuitous, so that it is at least clear that the higher order condition for 
conducting a critical discussion has not been violated that participants should be prepared to 
attempt to find some common ground. 
Giving reasons for a refusal to admit a proposition as a common starting point can be 
a perfectly sound way of strategic maneuvering, but it can also derail into a fallacy, e.g., the 
fallacy of tu quoque. In the tu quoque case, the reason-giving amounts to saying that the 
protagonist’s proposal to treat a proposition as a starting point is not acceptable because the 
proposition is inconsistent with something the protagonist has said or implied (by what he 
said or did) on a different occasion.15 If, for example, a protagonist proposes to start the 
discussion from the assumption that all promises should be kept at all times, the antagonist 
may point out that earlier on the protagonist advocated a less strict moral view or that he 
never keeps his own promises.16 What soundness conditions make it possible to decide 
whether or not an antagonist maneuvers in an admissible way when refusing to admit a 
proposition as a starting point because of a proclaimed inconsistency between the proposed 
proposition and the protagonist’s (verbal or non-verbal) behavior on a different occasion? 
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6. Soundness conditions for pointing out inconsistencies in the opening stage 
 
The soundness of the strategic maneuvering hinges on three points: a point of 
definition, a matter of scope, and a quasi-empirical issue. The first point is one of a logico-
pragmatic nature: how is inconsistency to be defined so that it is possible to determine 
whether two propositions are logically or pragmatically inconsistent? The second point is 
how an accusation by the antagonist that pertains to an inconsistency between the proposition 
that the protagonist presently proposes as a starting point and something the protagonist has 
earlier done can be incorporated. The third point is to find out what in practice is to be 
understood by “on a different occasion,” so that it can be determined in a specific case 
whether viewed dialectically pointing at an inconsistency makes sense. We shall address 
these three issues. 
An adequate argumentation theory should make clear how the parties engaged in an 
argumentative exchange can make use of logical and pragmatic insight to arrive at a common 
understanding of (undesired) inconsistency. Because logical as well as pragmatic insight may 
be derived from a variety of logical systems and theories of language use, it would be helpful 
if a coherent choice could be made that is based on a well-considered and mutually agreed 
upon philosophy of reasonableness and rationality. Such an opportunity is, for instance, 
offered by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation as it is externalized in the model 
for conducting a critical discussion. If the parties engaged in a critical discussion have come 
to an agreement about which logical and pragmatic views of inconsistency they will rely on, a 
decision about whether or not two propositions are actually logically or pragmatically 
inconsistent eventually depends on the result of the relevant ‘intersubjective inference 
procedure’ they need to go through (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, Ch. 6). 
 Strictly speaking, the question of how a person who has performed a certain action 
can be held committed to a certain proposition falls within the domain of action theory. The 
current state of affairs in action theory is such, however, that no decisive criteria are available 
for determining in all cases univocally whether or not a certain action implies a commitment 
to a particular proposition (see, e.g., Walton, 1998: 31). In an earlier paper (van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser, 2002b: 20) we have made a contribution to resolving this problem by making a 
distinction between avowed commitments and contextual commitments. Avowed 
commitments are propositional commitments that are explicitly assumed by the performance 
of speech acts of the assertive type and they resemble the commitments that Walton and 
Krabbe (1995) call “concessions.” Contextual commitments are, in our conception, 
commitments that are assumed to be inherent in the discussion situation at hand. Obviously, 
the propositional commitments that might be implied by the protagonist’s actions belong to 
the latter category. Because contextual commitments are open to rejection and can eventually 
only be of real consequence for the discussion if they stand up to an appropriate 
intersubjective identification procedure, having performed a certain action can commit a 
party to a certain proposition only if the parties engaged in the dialogue agree that the action 
implies, or can be “translated in,” the proposition concerned. This may not seem to be very 
helpful, but it should be borne in mind that in practical discussion situations all kinds of 
agreements are presupposed that admit certain actions but prohibit others because they imply 
a particular propositional commitment that is at odds with an “external” agreement. Examples 
of such external agreements are legal (or semi-legal) contracts, legal (or semi-legal) 
procedures, and even engaging in particular institutional or semi-institutional practices (see, 
e.g., Walton, 1998: 285).17
The last issue we have left to address is what is to be understood by “on a different 
occasion.” This issue seems empirical, but from a pragma-dialectical point of view it is not 
entirely so. In pragma-dialectics, “on a different occasion” is defined as meaning “in a 
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different critical discussion than the present one.” Therefore, from a pragma-dialectical point 
of view, an inconsistency between something that is presently said and something that was 
said on a different occasion matters only if it involves an inconsistency in one and the same 
critical discussion. This point is particularly important when we are dealing with a 
proclaimed inconsistency between a party’s starting points. The starting points that are 
assumed in a critical discussion are assumed for the sake of having a constructive critical 
discussion in a specific argumentative situation and this implies that the participants in such a 
discussion cannot automatically be held committed to having accepted these starting points in 
their own right and for their own sake. In a different critical discussion they are fully entitled 
to assume starting points that are precisely the opposite. The only thing they are not allowed 
to do is to accept and deny one and the same starting point in one and the same critical 
discussion. 
 This insight may seem hard to apply to a practical argumentative situation. A critical 
discussion in the pragma-dialectical sense is after all an idealization of a resolution-oriented 
argumentative exchange and not a real-life discussion. It is, however, precisely this 
discrepancy that makes it possible to resolve the problem of what is to be understood by “on 
a different occasion” in a primarily theoretical way, instead of purely empirically. Because 
real-life discussions never fully coincide with a critical discussion, an evaluation of a piece of 
actual argumentative discourse with the help of the model of critical discussion always 
requires a certain amount of methodical reconstruction which takes those and only those 
(explicit and implicit) elements of the discourse into account that can have a function in the 
process of resolving a difference of opinion. Such a reconstruction may assign contributions 
to the resolution process to one and the same critical discussion that are in practice 
temporally or locally distributed. If, for instance, a letter to the editor reacts to a newspaper 
article that was published a week earlier, the article and the letter will be reconstructed as two 
contributions to the same critical discussion. In some cases, pieces of argumentative 
discourse can only be properly understood if they are first reconstructed as one critical 
discussion. This implies that the answer to the question of what should count as “one and the 
same critical discussion” ultimately depends on whether it is theoretically as well as 
empirically justified to reconstruct particular pieces of argumentative discourse as being part 
of one and the same critical discussion. How can it be determined if such a reconstruction is 
justified? 
 We think that a reconstruction of two or more pieces of argumentative discourse as 
being part of one and the same critical discussion is justified if the following conditions are 
fulfilled: 
 
 (1) All pieces of argumentative discourse are aimed at resolving the same 
difference of opinion; 
 (2) All pieces of argumentative discourse have the same procedural starting 
points; 
 (3) All pieces of argumentative discourse (except for those that are at issue) have 
the same material starting points; 
 (4) The party whose proposal to use a certain proposition as a starting point was 
rejected in a certain piece of argumentative discourse has assumed the same 
position and the same discussion role in any of the preceding pieces of 
discourse under consideration. 
 
 The first condition excludes cases in which the issues that are discussed in the various 
pieces of argumentative discourse are not identical; the second condition excludes cases in 
which the same issue is discussed but different discussion rules are followed; the third 
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condition excludes cases in which there are also other starting points that differ than the 
starting point that is at issue; the fourth condition excludes cases in which the protagonist of 
the starting point at issue made this proposal while being in a different dialectical position or 
having a different discussion role (e.g., as protagonist and defender of the opposite 
standpoint).18 When taken together, these conditions guarantee that the proclaimed 
inconsistency between a starting point that a protagonist presently proposes and a starting 
point that this party proposed on a different occasion is an inconsistency in the opening stage 
of one and the same critical discussion. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 By developing a theoretical perspective on argumentative discourse that integrates 
rhetorical insight in a pragma-dialectical framework, we have shown how a systematic and 
general approach to the fallacies can be developed that explains their potential persuasiveness 
as well as why they go often unnoticed. We have argued that the pragma-dialectical model of 
a critical discussion can be a basis for designing a systematic classification of the various 
types of strategic maneuvering that enables us to develop more adequate criteria for 
distinguishing between sound and fallacious moves in argumentative discourse. As a case in 
point, we have shown how the soundness conditions can be identified of strategic 
maneuvering by means of pointing out inconsistencies in the other party’s verbal and non-
verbal behavior in the opening stage of a critical discussion, so that occurrences of the fallacy 
of tu quoque can be identified.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Among the protagonists of these new approaches are Hamblin (1970), Woods and Walton 
(1989), Barth and Krabbe (1982), Finocchiaro (1981), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 
1992a, 2003), Walton (1987, 1992, 1995), Johnson (2000), and Jacobs (2002). 
 
2 Since Hamblin issued the verdict that this feature brings an undesirable element of 
psychological subjectivity to the definition, fallacy theorists have not been concerned anymore 
with the question of why fallacies can be effective (Jackson, 1995). Among critical theorists, 
there was a broad consensus that it was desirable “to dispense with the use of vague and 
subjective concepts like appearance and seemingly correct” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 87: 
189). Whether an argument was correct of fallacious “surely must not be held to be question of 
the honorable or deceitful intentions of the arguer. Here lies the route to an altogether 
unwelcome “psychologism” (Woods and Walton, 1989: 64). 
 
3 A different kind of disadvantage is that the use of the labels for the fallacies is in these 
treatments often not restricted to cases that are considered unacceptable and unreasonable but 
also includes acceptable and reasonable cases. An argumentum ad hominem can then be an 
incorrect argumentative move but also a correct move. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1992b) pointed out that it is confusing to maintain that “not all fallacies are fallacious” or 
that “fallacies are not always fallacious.” We shall therefore reserve the names of the fallacies 
for the fallacious cases, but we add immediately that the use of the same label for both 
fallacious and non-fallacious moves may well be a sign that the authors who do so already 
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have a hunch of the kind of relationship between non-fallacious and fallacious moves we are 
about to discuss. 
 
4  The older publications of Woods and Walton, and some of Walton’s later work, provide good 
illustrations of how a label-oriented approach can easily lead to entirely different theoretical 
treatments of each of the fallacies. See Woods and Walton (1989). 
 
5 If abusive personal attacks, for instance, are judged fallacious in a theoretically interesting way, 
reference should be made to a general idea of reasonableness that implies certain standards for 
pursuing a particular goal with which abusive personal attacks are at odds. 
 
6 These requirements suggest that a theory of fallacies can be lacking in various ways. It may, 
for instance, provide a number of specific norms but no general rationale to back them up; but 
also mention only exceptions to the norms instead of providing criteria for applying these norms. 
 
7 See also Barth and Martens (1977). 
 
8 If the fallacies are viewed from a more general philosophical perspective, some studies of 
communicative acting by Habermas (1984) and Schreier et al. (e.g., 1995) can be added to this 
list. 
 
9 By relating their judgments concerning fallaciousness to an independent account of the sound 
counterpart of fallacies, dialectical theories explain why a fallacious argument is fallacious. Why 
exactly a sound argument that complies with the rules is sound, is to be explained independently. 
 
10 It could just be a coincidence that a great many of the moves that, according to the theory are 
condemnable – or non-moves – from the perspective of problem-solving capacity turn also out 
to be fallacies in the traditional sense, but it is, of course, very likely that in developing the 
traditional views the lack of problem-solving capacity of certain types of moves played a role. 
 
11 Walton’s (1992) notion of a ‘dialectical shift,’ as developed further in Walton and Krabbe 
(1995) comes, although it is conceptually not very clear, closest to a tool for taking such 
complications into account. 
 
12 As Hamblin (1970: 138-140, 158) informs us, scholars like Peter Ramus (Dialectique, 
1555) and, in his wake, Fraunce (Lawiers Logike, 1588) still saw fallacies as the ‘captious’ 
counterparts of sound argument forms known as – dialectical and rhetorical – topics, while 
scholars like Wallis (The Insitutio Logicae, 1688) and Aldrich (Artis Logicae Compendium, 
1691) dropped the connection between fallacies and topics. 
 
13 It stands to reason that to provide a more refined inventory of the types of strategic 
maneuvering pertinent to the various stages, these stage-related ‘local’ aims need to be further 
specified. 
 
14 It may make a difference for the negotiations about the starting points which type of dispute 
initiated the main discussion. When two consecutive attempts are made to resolve two non-
mixed discussions ensuing from a mixed dispute, for instance, a particular proposition cannot be 
at the same time accepted as a common starting point in the first discussion and not in the 
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second discussion. In the case of a non-mixed discussion ensuing from a non-mixed dispute, no 
such restrictions apply. 
 
15 A rhetorical technique that comes close to this type of maneuvering is described in classical 
rhetoric as the ab adversariorum-technique of anticategoria (‘counter charge,’ ‘accusing in 
turn,’ Latin: accusatio adversa, translatio in adversarium, incidens quaestio, meaning ‘a retort 
in which one turns the very accusation made by one’s adversary back against him’). Lausberg 
(1998: section 197) describes the objective of anticategoria as compromising the prosecutor, in 
this way proving his lack of jurisdiction. Anticategoria is divided into two genera. In reply to the 
prosecutor’s accusation, the defendant charges the prosecutor with having committed (1) the 
same particular crime, or (2) another crime; the other crime is in different ways related to the 
crime of which the defendant is accused. In the second case, the relationship can be one of 
similarity [with any other crime], one of causality [remotio, as in “Befehl ist Befehl”] or one 
between the crime and the act of prosection itself [as in a dépit amoureux]. In today’s law courts, 
the admissibility of this type of technique is not undisputed. In its decision of 3 February 1999, 
the Trial Chamber [of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], for 
instance, ruled that “the principle of tu quoque does not apply to international humanitarian law 
since that body of law creates obligations erga omnes (contractantes) and not obligations based 
on reciprocity.” The Chamber found, however, that “evidence of events beyond the main 
geographical focus of the indictment may be admissible insofar as it is not repetitious and is duly 
circumscribed and intended to rebut the allegations, explain the behaviour of the accused or 
provide information concerning the organisation and activities of the armies involved.” The 
Chamber added that “before adducing such evidence, the defence should state its purpose” 
(http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1999/index.htm). 
 
16 In pragma-dialectics, tu quoque is primarily discussed as a violation of a rule for the 
confrontation stage of a critical discussion, but in the pragma-dialectical conception of tu quoque 
this fallacy can, unlike the other variants of the argumentum ad hominem, also be committed in 
a later stage of the discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003, Ch. 6). Then, the tu quoque is 
not aimed at preventing the other party from maintaining a certain standpoint, but from founding 
the case for a certain standpoint on a particular starting point. 
 
17 Maxims such as “Practice what you preach” may, when turned around to mean that one 
should not say things that are at odds with what one practices, even be regarded to point at the 
existence of a general agreement that carrying out actions precludes having commitments that 
are inconsistent with these actions. 
 
18 In the classification of types of outcome of an argumentative dialogue proposed by Barth and 
Martens (1977), our conditions apply to a thesis T being tenable ex consessis against opponent 
O because it can be successfully defended against this opponent on the basis of a set of 
concessions C. Barth and Martens also distinguish outcomes less dependent on the opponents 
and their concessions: (1) a thesis tenable ex concessis (“follows logically from a set of 
concessions C”) because it can be successfully defended against any opponent O on the basis of 
a set of concessions C, and (2) a thesis tenable ( “logically true”) because it can be successfully 
defended against any opponent O on the basis of any set of concessions. 
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